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Abstract 
This article discusses the relationship between micro-prudential variables and bank risk. 
For this purpose, we collect panel data on 21 Danish banks accounting for 88% of total 
market share in Denmark from 2000 to 2015 and reflect upon the contribution of these 
different variables to bank individual, systematic and systemic risks. Our results suggest 
that the factors size, capitalization, funding structure, organizational complexity and 
degree of market-based activities are key risk determinants. Moreover, we find evidence 
that the Danish case is relatively peculiar with respect to the effects of bank size and of 
degree of market-based activities: Bank size contributes positively to systematic and 
systemic risks, but not to individual risk. Degree of market-based activities contributes to 
counteract individual risk, but on the other hand intensifies systematic and systemic risks. 
The Danish case could be taken as an example for other small economies with a highly 
concentrated banking sector.  
1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis banking risk received central attention of 
policymakers and regulators. With the aim of preventing future crises, new institutions 
were created and financial regulations were strengthened. In the European Union, for 
example, the European System of Financial Supervision was established and in the 
Euro-area the Single Supervisory Mechanism which is part of the so-called banking 
union1 was implemented. Similarly, in Denmark the Danish Systemic Risk Council 
was established in 2013 as an authority meant to monitor, identify and contribute to 
limiting systemic risk (Danish National Bank, 2014). According to the Systemic Risk 
Council Report (2014) “so far, experience with macroprudential policies is limited in 
Denmark and internationally, and the policy area is still at an early stage of 
development”. 
The main objective of this article is to understand the different drivers of 
banking risk and help policymakers and regulators with the development of tools to 
restrict it. Moreover, this research investigates whether these drivers affect the 
                                                             
1 Whereas some countries that are not members of the Euro-area like Denmark announced planning to join 
the banking union in the past, other countries like the Czech Republic follow a “wait and see” approach.  
*We would like to acknowledge the help of two anonymous referees in the development of this article. 
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different categories of risk, namely individual, systematic and systemic risks, in a 
similar way. Thus, we discuss whether micro-prudential policies are suitable for 
macro-prudential purposes. The Danish case can be seen as example for other highly 
concentrated banking sectors like the Central and East European countries and 
Belgium to name another Western European economy. 
Moreover, we discuss how our results can be used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of risk dampening policies taken by authorities. In order to reflect upon this 
effectiveness, we concentrate our analysis on the Danish economy by examining 
whether the rules set by the so-called “Supervisory Diamond” of the Danish Financial 
Supervisory Authority (DFSA) are consistent with our results. Usually bank size, 
capitalization, funding structure, involvement in market-based activities and 
organizational complexity are considered to be the key drivers of risk in the banking 
sector (inter alia Laeven et al., 2016).  
The relationship between these risk drivers and banking risk are of major 
importance to prevent financial distress (inter alia Cipra and Hendrych, 2017). In this 
article, we distinguish between the three different crucial risk categories. We proxy 
individual risk by a banks’ stock returns indicating higher individual risk in case of 
lower returns. For systematic risk we use the bank’s beta factor, since it can be 
considered a transformation of all types of popular measures of systematic risk (inter 
alia Benoit et al., 2013) and because it is intuitive and easy to use. For systemic risk 
we use SRISK and LRMES,2 the key variables in proxying systemic risk in Denmark 
and widely used by the Danish central bank (Grinderslev and Kristiansen, 2016).3  
We follow Laeven et al. (2016) and apply panel regressions to 21 Danish banks 
representing 88% of market capitalization between the years 2000 and 2015 (see 
Appendix I). For our analysis we regress the banks’ annual characteristics of risk in 
the crisis years of 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011 on potential risk factors of the previous 
years 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010, respectively. 
The estimated regression models provide evidence that the variables 
capitalization (expressed by tier 1 capital ratio), funding structure (expressed by the 
relation between deposits and total assets) and market-based activities (expressed by 
the share of non-interest income) affect individual risk: the lower capitalization, the 
more unstable funding and the lower the degree of market-based activities the higher 
the banks’ individual risk. Thus, in order to control individual risk, a higher tier 1 
capital ratio, a higher relation between deposits and assets and a higher share of non-
interest income should be required. 
Our models of systematic risk indicate that bank size increases this type of risk. 
Besides, in line with the regressions for individual risk, we observe that a robust 
funding structure and a strong capitalization decrease systematic risk. Moreover, a 
higher ratio between deposits and assets and a higher tier 1 capital ratio interact with 
bank size. This means that a higher share of deposits and a higher tier 1 capital ratio 
counteract systematic risk more intensively in larger banks. 
                                                             
2 Unfortunately, SRISK and LRMES data series are only available only for five Danish banks. However, 
these account for 70% of total market share. 
3 Notice that the choice of these variables to measure systemic risk is directly associated to their use by the  
Danish financial authorities. It is not our intention here to discuss the quality of the different systemic risk 
measurements. For more detail on this issue, see Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and Wosser (2017). 
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Our models of systemic risk4 indicate that size and the ratio between loans and 
assets contribute to systemic risk. Besides, the interaction of size with leverage 
indicates that leverage increases the effect of size on systemic risk. The opposite is 
identified for the size interaction with the share of deposits and of loans in total assets. 
Consequently, big banks in Denmark should be required to have a lower leverage and 
a lower ratio between loans and assets.  
Overall, our results are in line with Laeven et al. (2016) who show that systemic 
risk is higher for larger banks. However, in the case of Denmark, we find that bank 
size does not affect individual, but only systematic and systemic risks. This contradicts 
the positive effect of bank size on individual risk identified by Laeven et al. (2016) and 
Tchikanda (2017). Furthermore, the effect of the degree of market-based activities on 
risk is also peculiar in Denmark: while it decreases individual, it augments systematic 
and systemic risks. This could suggest a trade-off for the policy maker to control 
systemic and individual risks. Thus, if we consider macroeconomic stability a priority, 
the degree of market-based activities should be constrained. 
We structure this article as follows: An overview of the literature and of how 
this paper relates to it is given in section 2; information on the three different risk 
categories and on how we measure them is provided by section 3; section 4 presents 
our data including descriptive statistics alongside a brief overview of the Danish 
banking system; section 5 summarizes our empirical results and their implications for 
policy makers are discussed in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature 
The literature on banking risk has developed considerably during the past 
decade and is divided into three different strands: 1) the determination of the key 
drivers of risk; 2) the relationship between bank competition and overall financial 
stability; 3) the effectiveness of regulatory policies. Of course, the third strand is 
directly related to the former two. Our analysis is straightly related to the first one and 
evaluates the Danish regulation policies after the crises years. 
According to Laeven et al. (2016) bank size, involvement in market-based 
activities, unstable funding and increased organizational complexity had a positive 
contribution to systemic risk during the financial crisis, leading to a global financial 
collapse in 2008. Problems in large banks tend to be more damaging to the financial 
system than in smaller ones, because of the liquidity stress they generate. This is 
consequence of their reliance on economies of scale and scope that cannot be replaced 
by small banks. Thus, larger banks, on average, create more individual and systemic 
risk in comparison to smaller ones. This is especially true when banks are insufficiently 
capitalized and have unstable funding, which are both common features of large banks. 
Besides, larger banks also require a larger support of taxpayers in case they need to be 
bailed out. Østrup (2010) uses the classical failure of Lehman Brothers as an example 
of this problem, when a considerable number of other financial institutions experienced 
financial distress.  
                                                             
4 We acknowledge that due to data limitation, our sample for systemic risk regressions is much 
more restricted than in the studies of individual and systematic risks. Even though generally the effects of 
the different variables were found to be similar on the different concepts of risk, this issue can be seen as a 
limitation of our findings concerning systemic risk. 
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The positive effect of bank size on systemic risk was also confirmed by Pais 
and Stork (2013) for European banks. The authors analyzed the effect of bank size on 
univariate risk (measured by VaR) and on systemic risk. They found evidence of a 
small impact of size on univariate risk and a considerable impact of this variable on 
systemic risk. Besides, they showed that during the time period analyzed, systemic risk 
has risen for all banks. Kleinow et al. (2017) made a similar study for Latin America, 
in which the positive effect of bank size on systemic risk was verified. With respect to 
systematic risk, the research of Di Biase and D’Apolito (2012) as well as Viale and 
Madura (2014) can be mentioned. They identified a positive effect of bank size on 
systematic risk in Italy.  
Whereas the first strand of literature investigates the key drivers of banking 
risk, the second reflects upon banking competition and its overall role on financial 
stability. Kohn (2004), for example, argues that fragmentation and interdependence 
within the banking industry may reduce stability. Historically, the fragmented banking 
systems have been more susceptible to bank runs and consequently to panic compared 
to those composed of fewer large banks. According to the author, fragmented systems 
try to apply economies of scale through interbank connections, which consequently 
poses a higher threat to overall stability. For example, if a bank with large interbank 
deposits fails, it consequently affects all other small banks holding deposits with it. 
The author further shows that liquidity problems became less frequent with the 
consolidation of the banking system. 
In contrast to Kohn (2004), Leroy and Lucotte (2017) identified a dampening 
effect of competition on systemic risk. Although, the authors claim that higher 
competition increases individual risk, overall financial stability might benefit from 
higher competition due to a more synchronized risk-taking behavior of banks than 
when faced by weaker competition. Thus, the role of competition and thus 
concentration might be more complicated. For the Baltic countries, for example, 
Cuestas et al. (2017) found a U-shaped relationship between competition and stability. 
3. Individual, Systematic and Systemic Risks 
We define our models in different ways according to the type of risk we would 
like to analyze. We follow Laeven et al. (2016) in this exercise. The main idea here is 
to measure how the pre-crisis characteristics of banks contributed to individual, 
systematic and systemic risks during the crisis. In order to estimate the effect of the 
pre-crisis independent variables on the dependent variables during the crisis, lagged 
values of the independent variables are used.  
Individual Risk 
For estimating the individual bank risk, we regress each bank’s stock return in 
the crisis years 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011 (period t) on bank characteristics in 2006, 
2007, 2009 and 2010 (period t-1), respectively. This way, we define the model that 
describes the relationship between stock returns in crisis periods according to the 
different bank characteristics in the prior periods as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(1) 
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where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡  is the stock return of bank 𝑖 and period 𝑡, 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 is the log of total assets, 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is tier 1 capital ratio, 𝐷𝐴 is the fraction of funding of assets from deposits, 𝐿𝐴 is 
the share of loans in total assets, 𝑁𝐼 is the share of non-interest income in total income 
and 𝐿𝑅 is the leverage ratio. 
Systematic Risk 
For measuring the contribution of each of the bank’s characteristics to 
systematic risk we use the following regression: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
where 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the beta of bank 𝑖 and at period 𝑡. It represents the covariance between 
the stock return of bank 𝑖 and the return of the Danish market index OMXC20, divided 
by the variance of the latter. The measurement of beta is calculated according to the 
stock returns of the prior 12 months and those of the market index5. Thus, beta in period 
𝑡 corresponds to the beta registered for the last 12 month of the years 2007, 2008, 2010 
and 2011 (period t), while the independent variables are computed as before for periods 
2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010 (period t-1).  
Systematic Risk and Interactions 
When regressing systemic risk Laeven et al. (2016) find a reduced number of 
significant variables: only bank size and organizational complexity. Thus, they include 
the interactions of structural variables with bank size, which made the results more 
informative. We use the same type of technique for our regressions of systematic risk 
by regressing beta according to: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡.1𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(3) 
where 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 is the interaction between the log of total assets and tier 1 capital 
ratio, 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑁𝐼 is the interaction between the log of total assets and the share of 
non-interest income in total income, 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐿𝐴 is the interaction between the log of 
total assets and the share of loans in total assets and 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝐴 is the interaction 
between the log of total assets and the fraction of funding from deposits.  
                                                             
5 Beta is usually estimated using a period of 60 weeks of stock returns (Baker et al., 2013). First, the historical 
beta was computed using the 60 weeks period. Due to missing observations in data of weekly stock prices 
for some of the banks, however, part of the beta results obtained was inconsistent. The problem with using 
a 60 weeks period was the inability to calculate beta for all periods and for all the banks included in the 
sample. Therefore, to solve this problem, the monthly stock prices were used. This type of beta calculation 
follows Damodaran (1999) and was implemented by among others Acharya et al. (2012). 
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Systemic Risk 
For measuring the contribution of each of the bank’s characteristics to systemic 
risk, we use the following regression: 
 
𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(4) 
where 𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 is a measurement of systemic risk of bank 𝑖 in period 𝑡
6 that could 
is proxied in our case by SRISK or LRMES. The data series on SRISK and LRMES 
were provided by the NYU Stern School of Business. However, this measurement was 
only available for few Danish banks, so that our estimations of systemic risk are 
restricted to a small group of five banks (Danske Bank, Jyske Bank, Sydbank, 
Ringkjøbing Landbobank and Spar Nord Bank). Even though this restriction is not 
optimal, these banks represent together around 70% of Danish market share.  
Systemic Risk and Interactions 
As it was done for systematic risk, we also include interactions of bank size 
with other variables in the regression of systemic risk: 
𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡.1𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(5) 
4. Data Description 
4.1 The Danish Banking System 
The Danish banking system is very concentrated. It consists of few large 
banking groups and many smaller institutions. These large groups are responsible for 
the majority of credit in the Danish economy. Thus, the Danish system is among the 
most concentrated ones in Europe (Danish National Bank, 2016). The Danish example 
is didactical considering highly-concentrated banking systems, which is a typical 
characteristic in small open economies. The Baltic countries, for example, also have a 
high level of concentration (Cuestas et al., 2017). Although to a lower level, the 
banking sector of Czech Republic is also highly concentrated (Stavárek and Repková, 
2011, Heryán and Stavárek, 2012). 
According to Carstensen (2011), Denmark, like many other countries, was 
affected by the financial crisis. Danish banks faced a liquidity crisis due to their high 
dependence on international financial markets and tight connectivity among each 
other. This resulted in a considerable number of banks experiencing financial distress. 
Some of the banks went bankrupt, such as Roskilde Bank, while some others have been 
acquired by the so called “winding-up” company, the Financial Stability Company. On 
the other hand, some banks were subjected to capital restructuring, brought forward by 
                                                             
6 For more details on the definition of SRISK and LRMES, see Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Acharya et 
al. (2012). 
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mergers and acquisitions. These actions resulted in a concentration of the banking 
industry, which was constituted by 162 banks at the end of 2007 and only 110 banks 
in 2015 (Danish National Bank, 2012). If one excludes foreign banks, these numbers 
would reduce from 152 in 2007 to only 80 in 2015. 
After the financial crisis new regulations were created in Denmark, including 
the improvement of the DFSA’s power to intervene in financial institutions. The new 
regulations, however, favor the concentration of the banking system (Carstensen, 
2011). Consequently, there are fewer and larger banks in Denmark, a development that 
has been observed internationally in North America and Europe after the financial 
crisis. This could pose higher risk to the financial system in the future. As discussed 
by Dowd (2009) the banking sector became generally more concentrated, but the effect 
of this concentration on financial stability in the future is unknown. The problem of 
concentration is even stronger with the lobbying of larger banks at governmental 
institutions and with politicians, which could even intensify the recent concentration 
process (Blau et al., 2013). 
In Figures 1 to 7 (see Appendix III), we use statistics provided by the DFSA. 
Bank size is expressed by the natural logarithm of total assets. Even though Denmark 
is a relatively small country, the size of Danish banks varies from very large (with 
assets over 65 billion DKK) to very small ones (with assets under 500 million DKK). 
The DFSA divides banks into different groups according to their size and location, so 
that we can also observe the evolution in size in small banks. Group 1 includes banks 
that have over 65 billion DKK in assets, Group 2 includes those with over 12 billion 
DKK and Group 3 those with over 500 million DKK. The DFSA also has further data 
for Group 4, with assets under 500 million DKK, Group 5 with foreign banks branches 
in Denmark, and Group 6 with banks from Faroe Islands. However, none of the banks 
studied in this article are part of these latter groups. 
Figures 1 to 3 show the increase in banking size and concentration in Denmark 
between 2000 and 2014. Bank size increased considerably over the last 10 years of our 
data. The figures show a considerable growing trend for most of the banks until the 
financial crisis in 2008, when some of the banks experienced a decrease in total assets. 
However, after the crisis years of 2008 and 2009, the growing trend continues for most 
of the banks.  
Market concentration is reflected by the fraction of banking assets held by the 
three largest banks in the country, which increased intensively in most advanced 
economies including Denmark. Group 1 is of particular interest in this case as it is 
constituted by the Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). The 
difference between market participation of Danske Bank (56.6% in 2014) and the rest 
is significant. 
Figures 4 to 6 show a shift towards market-based activities as there is a 
tendency of reduction in loans as share of assets for all three groups. This decline, 
however, starts in the crisis years of 2008 and 2009. In the prior period one can observe 
a growing trend in this variable, when an intensive increase in lending took place in 
Denmark, particularly after 2003 (Østrup, 2010).  
Considering the crisis circumstances, the regulator decided to impose some 
restrictions including one to lending. The volume of loans decreased after 2008 and 
this decreasing trend continued due to these restrictions, which targeted the excessive 
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risk-taking in terms of lending. As result, banks found their profits squeezed, which 
led them to resort to other sources of income such as market-based activities. 
Figure 7 gives a good picture of this phenomenon: non-interest income 
increased considerably after 2000, but showed an abrupt fall during the period 2007-
2008 with the crisis. Afterwards, it increased again, but not as intensively as 
previously, and reduced again in 2011 to the same level of 2007 and 2008. Thereafter, 
it grows again, but with a much higher intensity than prior to 2008. Figure 7 shows an 
intensive and fast increase of non-interest income after 2011, when the lending 
restrictions were imposed. This leads us to the assumption that there is a relationship 
between the decrease in the share of loans and the increase in the share of non-interest 
income. 
We also analyze the Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the different 
variables. Appendix IV reports the resulting correlation matrix. Notice that most of the 
bank characteristics are related to each other, with some exceptions. There is a negative 
correlation between bank size and the variables tier 1 capital and share of deposits in 
assets. Bigger banks are associated with lower tier 1 capital as well as with a lower 
share of deposits in assets (unstable funding). Besides, there is a positive correlation 
between size and leverage (unstable funding). Furthermore, there is a negative 
correlation between the share of non-interest income and the share of loans in total 
assets, which supports the assumption that a reduction in the share of loans increases 
the share of non-interest income. These results go in line with the observation of 
Laeven et al. (2016) that “there is a structural reason why some banks become large, 
with lower capital, fragile funding and more market-based activities at the same time”. 
Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
We collected data from the following sources:  
• Yahoo Finance was used to collect historical stock prices adjusted for dividends 
and splits, for each of the publicly-traded bank and for the market index OMX 
Copenhagen 20. Even though most of the data used required annual returns, we 
also collected monthly returns in order to find the betas for our regressions of 
systematic risk.  
• The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority was used to collect the yearly 
financial accounts in the period 2000-2015. Specifically, this source was used to 
collect bank characteristics such as total assets, total loans, interest receivables, 
dividend on investments, charges and commissions receivables, market value 
adjustments, other operating income, income from holdings in associated and 
affiliated enterprises as well as other significant holdings, equity capital and total 
deposits. These data were then used to calculate our independent variables. 
• Bloomberg was used for collecting the tier 1 capital ratios. 
• Banks’ annual reports were collected from the different banks’ websites. These 
were used for verifying and collecting several bank characteristics that were 
neither available in the DFSA online database nor in Bloomberg.   
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• NYU Stern School of Business was used to collect the data series of SRISK and 
LRMES.7  
We concentrate our analysis on the 21 banks that cover 88% of total market 
capitalization. We, however, excluded banks that failed during the time of 
investigation. With the exception of Roskilde Bank, these banks were rescued by the 
government or acquired by larger banks. Thus, in the end, most of these failed banks 
are represented in our data sample indirectly. Descriptive statistics for our data sample 
are provided in the tables of Appendices II, IV and V. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
Before we run our regressions, it is important to test the variables for 
stationarity (Dreyer, 2012; Dreyer and Schmid, 2017). We ran the panel unit root test 
of Hadri (2000) and stationarity is confirmed for all variables. This makes sense due 
to the short period of the data series used in our regressions of 4 years.  
5.1 Test of Significance of Single Variables 
One can observe that equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) have many variables 
and the estimations of them all together in a single regression could raise concerns 
about the robustness of our estimates. A typical example is the so-called Simpson’s 
Paradox (Clifford, 1982), that could happen when two correlated variables are used in 
a single regression as independent variables and end up removing significance or even 
reverting the signal of one of their coefficients. 
Thus, we first decided to run simple pooling regressions of the dependent 
variables on each of the independent variables separately. The idea in this case is to 
make sure that the independent variables selected really have an effect on the different 
categories of risk before using them in the final estimations. This way we avoid the 
use of non-significant variables in the final estimations, something that would inflate 
the variances of the models. Secondly, after estimating the different models, we would 
like to compare the signs of each resulting coefficient to the prior signs of the simple 
regressions so that we can make sure that our results are robust.  
Results for simple regressions of stock returns (individual risk), betas 
(systematic risk), SRISK and LRMES (systemic risk) on the different variables are 
given by tables 1, 2 and 3. Notice that in order to simplify the presentation we decided 
to only present the estimated coefficients and their significances8.  
In table 1, from the six variables listed in the model of individual risk, only 
three proved to be significant: tier 1 capital, the ratio of deposits and assets and non-
interest income. The positive signals of the first two coefficients are expected: a higher 
tier 1 ratio increases returns in stressful scenarios as well as a higher relation between 
deposits and total assets. This means that bank capitalization and funding structure are 
key variables for increasing stability of the individual banks. On the other hand, the 
variable non-interest income is significant and positive in Denmark, which implies that 
banks that generate more income from non-interest activities are less likely to 
experience financial distress. 
                                                             
7 Unfortunately, NYU Stern only provides SRISK and LRMES data series for 5 Danish banks. However, 
these account for 70% of total market share. 
8 Complete results for each regression including intercepts, R², etc. are available upon request.  
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This positive result is an exception when compared to other countries 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Likely, this happens because Danish banks do 
not participate significantly in the mortgage credit, which is supposed to be a low risk 
interest income market. This means that the type of interest income of Danish banks is 
more related to higher risk credit, what explains partly the controversial positive 
relation between market-based activities and stock returns in stressful scenarios. 
Table 1 Simple Regressions of Individual Risk 
Dependent Variable: Stock Returns 
 Coef. St. Err. p-value  
Assetst-1 0.00 0.02 0.88  
Tiert-1 0.02 0.01 0.03 * 
DAt-1 0.00 0.00 0.10 . 
LAt-1 0.00 0.00 0.23  
NIt-1 0.02 0.01 0.00 ** 
LRt-1 0.00 0.01 0.46  
Notes: The dependent variables are Stock Returns in t period (crisis period). ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’, and ‘.’ indicate 
significance at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels. Sources: The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority 
Statistics, Yahoo Finance Historical Prices, Bloomberg and authors’ own calculation. 
In table 2, from the six variables listed in the models of systematic risk without 
interactions, five proved to be significant: log of total assets, tier 1 capital, the ratios 
between deposits and loans with total assets and leverage. The positive sign of log of 
total assets is no surprise. Bigger banks increase systematic risk during times of crisis. 
The negative sign of tier 1 capital shows that undercapitalized banks are frequently 
associated with higher systematic risk. The negative signs of the share of deposits and 
loans in total assets indicate that funding structure and the higher engagement of a bank 
in lending activities (not market-based activities) reduce systematic risk. This 
characteristic of lending activities is verified in Denmark the same way it is for the 
international setting (see Leavin et al. 2016) even though Danish banks do not 
participate significantly in the mortgage credit as explained earlier. Finally, the 
positive sign of leverage indicates that it increases systematic risk. When explaining 
systemic risk in table 3, these variables present the same characteristics, except for tier 
1 capital, which in this case is not significant. Notice that results are very similar no 
matter the type of variable we choose to measure systemic risk (SRISK or LRMES). 
Table 2 Simple Regressions of Systematic Risk 
Dependent Variable: Betas 
 Coef. St. Err. p-value  
Assetst-1 0.19 0.03 0.00 *** 
Tiert-1 -0.08 0.02 0.00 *** 
DAt-1 -0.03 0.00 0.00 *** 
LAt-1 -0.02 0.01 0.02 * 
NIt-1 -0.01 0.01 0.28  
LRt-1 0.07 0.01 0.00 *** 
Assetst-1*Tiert-1 0.00 0.00 0.01 ** 
Assetst-1*NIt-1 0.00 0.00 0.30  
Assetst-1*LAt-1 0.00 0.00 0.54  
Assetst-1*DAt-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 
Assetst-1*LRt-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 
Notes: The dependent variables are Betas in t period (crisis period). ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’, and ‘.’ indicate significance at 
0.001, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels. Sources: The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority Statistics, Yahoo 
Finance Historical Prices, Bloomberg and authors’ own calculation. 
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The same analysis can be made for interactions. In table 2, the interaction of 
log of total assets with tier 1 capital is significant and negative when explaining 
systematic risk. Thus, there is an extra stabilizing effect of tier 1 capital in bigger 
banks. This effect, however, is not verified for systemic risk (see table 3).  On the other 
hand, we can observe in table 3 that the interaction between log of total assets and the 
ratio between loans and assets is significant and negative when explaining systemic 
risk. This shows that the engagement of banks in lending activities (not market-based) 
has an extra stabilizing effect in bigger banks when we look at systemic risk. This is, 
however, not verified for systematic risk (table 2). 
Interactions that are significant to explain both systematic and systemic risks 
are those between log of total assets and leverage and the ratio between deposits and 
assets. The former interaction has a negative sign, an indication that capitalized banks 
have an extra stabilizing effect when they are bigger. The latter has a positive sign and 
indicates that there is an extra positive effect of leverage on systematic and systemic 
risks when banks are bigger. 
  
 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































332                                               Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 68, 2018, no. 4 
5.2 Estimating Our Models 
We decided to run pooling estimations for panel data in all cases for different 
reasons: 
• Among others, Laeven et al. (2016) use fixed effects to run this type of 
regressions that include different countries. This allows each country to have 
its own intercept so that the different characteristics of countries can be 
considered by their models. Thus, in each country banks are estimated 
together. In our case, tests are made solely for banks in Denmark so that it 
would be natural to choose directly the pooling technique. To put it simple: 
should brand matter for the size of a bank’s risk so that a group of banks in a 
single country would have different intercepts? If the answer for this question 
would be “yes”, risk metrics would be influenced by the brand of a bank with 
all other risk factors constant, but this seems unrealistic.  
• In all our regressions (tables 4 to 8), the LMBP (Lagrange Multiplier Breusch-
Pagan) test is not significant suggesting that we do not need to resort to 
techniques of panel effects (fixed and random) for our estimations9. However, 
in order to be careful, we decided to rerun all our regressions using fixed 
effects. Afterwards, we compared these results against those of the pooling 
regressions using the F-test for individual effects. Confirming our initial 
thoughts, in none of the regressions the F-statistic is significant, so that the 
fixed effects methodology should not be preferred against the pooling 
estimations. Results for the F-tests are available in tables 4 to 8 and complete 
results for the fixed effects estimations are available upon request.     
We started our estimations by including year dummies (time dummies) in order 
to allow for any specific time effects. In most of the cases these time dummies proved 
not to be significant, such that we decided to continue our estimations without them. 
Moreover, in all our regressions, there is no evidence against neither normality nor 
homoscedasticity of our residuals, since both Jarque-Bera and Breusch-Pagan tests 
suggest not to reject their respective null hypotheses.  
It is also common to observe the problems of residual autocorrelation in 
estimations that use a panel data setting. Our data frame, however, consists of only 
four years, such that autocorrelation tests on residuals would make little sense. In order 
to be conservative, we decided to use a HAC covariance matrix anyway 
(heteroskedasticity autocorrelation consistent) to adjust the standard deviations of our 
estimates. 
5.2.1 Individual Risk 
In our analysis, we consider that the lower the stock return during stress periods, 
the higher its individual risk. In other words: the larger the loss, the riskier the bank. 
We decided to run 3 different regressions for individual risk (equation 1). In regression 
1, we only selected those variables that were significant in the earlier simple 
regressions of individual risk. Afterwards, we included total assets in regression 2, as 
                                                             
9 This way of choosing the most reliable panel technique for our data setting goes in line with Dreyer and 
Schmid (2015). 
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this variable is of major concern in banking risk. Then we decided to run regression 3 
with all variables. Table 4 summarizes the results of these three OLS regressions.  
Regression 1 estimates the relation between stock returns and tier 1 capital, the 
relation between deposits and assets and non-interest income. In this case, the tier 1 
ratio and non-interest income are positive and significant at the 10% significance level, 
confirming the positive relation they have with stock returns found in the earlier simple 
regressions. The tier 1 ratio is a variable that is associated to bank capitalization and 
non-interest income to the bank’s involvement in market-based activities. Thus, these 
positive coefficients reveal that the higher the capitalization and the higher the 
participation of the bank in market-based activities, the lower the individual risk. For 
every 1%-point increase in the tier 1 capital ratio and in the share of non-interest 
income, returns increase by 1.51% and 1.81% points respectively. Notice that a 
positive relation between non-interest income and stock returns in the Danish case 
during crises periods go against the international evidence exemplified by Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2010). Likely, this happens because Danish banks do not 
participate significantly in the mortgage credit as explained earlier.   
Regression 2 includes the log of total assets in the regression. Results confirm 
the lack of significance found for this variable in the earlier simple regression and 
indicate that this variable does not drive individual risk in Denmark. Further 
coefficients confirm results of regression 1 with an extra significant and positive 
coefficient, the one associated with the relation between deposits and assets. This result 
indicates that funding structure matter in the case of individual risk. We can say that 
for every 1% point increase in tier 1 capital ratio, in the relation between deposits and 
assets and in the share of non-interest income, returns increase by 1.46%, 0.59% and 
1.83% points respectively.  
Regression 3 includes all variables and estimation results go in line with the 
prior two. Capitalization, funding structure and the degree of the bank’s involvement 
in market-based activities matter to define individual risk. The sign of the coefficients 
confirm those of the prior simple regressions and indicate that these variables should 
be taken into consideration by the regulator in order to control individual risk. For 
every 1% point increase in tier 1 capital ratio, in the relation between deposits and 
assets and in share non-interest income, returns increase by 1.9%, 0.61% and 1.98% 
points respectively.  
One further result is interesting to be discussed and has to do with the lack of 
significance of bank size in defining individual risk. For the international setting, 
bigger banks are usually associated with lower stock returns during crisis periods and 
thus with higher individual risk. This contra-intuitive result constitutes an individual 
characteristic of the Danish economy and is further discussed by Buchholst and 
Rangvid (2013). These authors point out for a longer time period that the bigger the 
bank, the lower the individual risk in Denmark, what again constitutes a very specific 
Danish characteristic.  
  
 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 68, 2018, no. 4                                               335 
5.2.2 Systematic Risk 
In order to analyze systematic risk, we regress beta according to equations (2) 
and (3).  
5.2.2.1 Systematic Risk: When Interactions are not Considered 
We decided to run three different regressions for systematic risk (equation 2). 
In regression 4, we only selected those variables that were significant in the earlier 
simple regressions of systematic risk. In regression 5, we removed those variables that 
were not significant in regression 4 and finally added all remaining variables in 
regression 6. Table 5 summarizes results of these three OLS regressions.  
Regression 4 estimates the relation between beta and the characteristics of the 
banks, excluding non-interest income that was not significant in the prior simple 
regressions of systematic risk. Results show that the variables bank size, tier 1 capital 
ratio and share of deposits in total assets are significant at the 10% significance level.  
Our estimate related to bank size has a positive sign, which reveals that for 
every 1% increase in total assets, the beta of a bank increases by 0.0017. Thus, bank 
size is a determinant factor of systematic risk. Besides, the estimate related to tier 1 is 
also significant, what reveals that undercapitalized banks have a higher systematic risk. 
For every 1% point increase in tier 1 capital ratio, beta decreases by 0.047.  
The coefficient related to the ratio between deposits and total assets shows that 
for a 1% point increase in this variable, beta would decrease by 0.011. This means that 
deposits (funding structure) have a stabilizing effect, reducing systematic risk.  
In regression 5 those variables that are not significant in regression 4 are 
excluded. All other coefficients remain significant: bank size, tier 1 capital and the 
share of deposits in total assets. For every 1% increase of total assets, beta increases 
by 0.0014. On the other hand, for a 1% point increase in tier 1 and in the share of 
deposits in total assets, systematic risk decreases by 0.042 and 0.013. Thus, our 
estimates for regression 5 indicate that bank size affect systematic risk positively while 
capitalization and funding structure negatively.  
Regression 6 confirms prior results. Here, for a 1% increase of total assets, a 
1% point increase in tier 1 and in the share of deposits in total assets, systematic risk 
increases by 0.0017, decreases by 0.046 and decreases by 0.011 respectively. Thus, 
our estimates for regression 6 also indicate that bank size affects systematic risk 
positively while capitalization and funding structure negatively.  
Generally, regressions 4 to 6 show that size, tier 1 (capitalization) and the 
relation between deposits and total assets (funding structure) are key determinants of 
systematic risk. The larger the amount of assets, the lower the capitalization measured 
by tier 1 capital and the higher the weight of other sources of funding for assets than 
deposits, the higher the beta during shock periods.  
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5.2.2.2 Systematic risk: Considering Interactions 
In order to test the influence of our interaction terms in systematic risk (equation 
3), we first selected those of them that were significant in the prior individual simple 
regressions of systematic risk. In order to start our tests (regression 7), we included 
those terms alongside the variables that where significant in the prior regressions 4 to 
6: log of total assets, tier 1 capital and the relation between deposits and assets. Results 
for regression 7 are provided in table 6. Notice that estimation results using the 
interaction terms along with these three variables proved to be weak. None of the 
coefficients are significant, except for the log of total assets.  
We thus suspected of problems of multicollinearity and decided to run the 
correlation matrix of our independent variables to search for an ideal non-interaction 
candidate to be removed. This matrix is given in Appendix IV. The correlation between 
log of total assets and the relation between deposits and assets seems to be highest of 
almost 80%. Thus, we decided to remove the last variable and run regression 8, where 
again the variable log of total assets is significant. In this case, the interaction between 
log of total assets and the relation between deposits and assets is significant, indicating 
that the bigger the bank, the more a higher relation between deposits and assets 
(funding structure) decreases beta.    
We also ran regression 9, where we leave all interaction terms alongside total 
assets (significant variable of regressions 7 and 8). Here, we further notice the 
significant and negative effect of the interaction between tier 1 capital and bank size, 
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5.2.3 Systemic Risk 
Systemic risk is measured by SRISK and LRMES. In this section we test the 
significance of the different variables described in equations 4 and 5 for explaining 
systemic risk.  
5.2.3.1 Systemic Risk: When Interactions are not Considered 
Table 7 shows the estimation results for equation 4, where SRISK and LRMES 
are regressed the same way as beta in the systematic analysis. Regression 10 estimates 
the relation between systemic risk and those bank characteristics that proved to be 
significant in the earlier simple regression analysis of systemic risk: log of total assets, 
the shares of deposits and loans in total assets and leverage. From those, log of total 
assets and the share of loans in total assets proved to be significant. When LRMES is 
used, the share of deposits in total assets and leverage are also significant.  
The higher the level of log of total assets, the higher the systemic risk, which 
was expectable according to our earlier simple regressions analysis. The same is valid 
for the positive relation of leverage with systemic risk when the dependent variable is 
LRMES.    
However, the positive signs of the share of loans in total assets (both in the 
regression of SRISK and LRMES) and of the share of deposits in total assets (when 
LRMES is regressed) look strange because it goes against our results when each 
individual variable is regressed. This lack of robustness could be linked to the so called 
Simpson’s paradox, which could happen when using very correlated data series as 
described earlier. Therefore, it is mandatory in this case to analyze the correlation 
matrix between our variables. This is offered in Appendix V.   
Notice that the correlation between the share of loans in total assets with total 
assets and with the share of deposits in total assets equal 0.96 and 0.81 respectively. 
Besides, leverage presents also high correlations with total assets and with the share of 
deposits in total assets: 0.91 and 0.85 respectively. Thus, we decided to rerun our 
regression removing the share of loans in total assets and leverage (regression 11) and 
then removing total assets and leverage (regression 12) to observe results.  
In the case of regression 11, only log of total assets is significant. Notice that 
even though the share of deposits in total assets remains non-significant, its sign 
reversed and now is according to what we would expect. As it was the case for 
systematic risk, bank size contributes to systemic risk positively. For every 1% 
increase in total assets, SRISK increases by 50.97 and LRMES by 3.94. Thus, bank 
size is a determinant factor of systemic risk.  
In the case of regression 12, the share of loans in total assets is significant and 
has a “correct” negative sign when compared to the initial simple regressions of 
systemic risk. For every 1% point increase in the relation between loans and assets, 
SRISK decreases by 581 and LRMES by 0.47. The lower systemic risk implied from 
lending activities in this case indicate that the participation of banks in market-based 
activities increase systemic risk. It is interesting to note that in the study of individual 
risk, the participation of banks in market-based activities had the opposite effect 
(higher non-interest income acted to stabilize individual risk).  
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So, we can conclude that a higher engagement of banks in market-based 
activities contributes to systemic risk even in Denmark, where banks do not participate 
so much in the more secure type of lending which is related to mortgage securities.    
Thus, generally, regressions 10 to 12 show that size and the relation between 
loans and total assets can be seen as key determinants of systemic risk. The larger the 
amount of assets, and the lower the weight of loans in total assets, the higher the value 
of systemic risk during shock periods.  
5.2.3.2 Systemic risk: Considering Interactions 
Table 8 shows the results for the estimations of systemic risk using the 
interaction variables that were significant in the prior individual regressions of banks 
characteristics on systemic risk according to equation 5. These significant interactions 
are those between total assets and the following variables: share of loans in total assets, 
share of deposits in total assets and leverage10.    
We start with regression 13, where all these significant interactions are used 
alongside those variables that were significant in the prior regressions 10 to 12, which 
include total assets and the share of loans in total assets. These two variables as well 
as all three interactions are significant at the 10% significance level. Confirming our 
prior results, bank size increases systemic risk and this effect is now even stronger for 
banks that have higher leverage and weaker for banks with a higher relations between 
loans and assets and between deposits and assets. On the other hand, a higher relation 
between loans and assets decreases systemic risk. This effect is even stronger the 
bigger the bank is, indicating that the involvement of banks in lending activities reduce 
systemic risk.  
We try to add the relation between deposits and total assets in our final 
regression 14, but no additional conclusions can be taken as this variable does not 
prove to be significant.  
The evidence of these interaction effects goes in line with Laeven et al. (2016) 
and supports the idea of the presence of economies of scale and scope in banking. The 
larger the size of a bank and the lower the loan share of assets (degree of market-based 
activities), the larger the systemic risk. This also indicates that larger banks that 
generate more income from non-interest activities are more likely to contribute to 
systemic distress. 
  
                                                             
10 Notice that in the case of the variable LRMES, the interaction between assets and the share of deposits 
in assets was not significant in the simple regressions, but we used anyway this interaction term in the 
regressions of LRMES in order to be able to compare results with those of SRISK. 
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6. Discussion of Results 
Our results do not indicate that bank size contributes to stock performance 
during the crises periods. The lack of a negative significant effect of bank size on stock 
returns can be seen as a particular result for Denmark. Although counterintuitive, the 
nonexistence of this negative effect is confirmed by Buchholst and Rangvid (2013), 
who show that larger banks performed even better during these periods than smaller 
banks in Denmark. Thus, size is not a driver of individual risk.  
Significant variables that influence stock returns positively in crisis 
environments are tier 1 capital, the share of deposits in total assets and market-based 
activities expressed by non-interest income.  
This last variable however indicates something peculiar: The involvement of 
the bank in market-based activities reduces individual risk. As we discussed, this is 
special in our example in which bank loans have a relatively higher risk than in other 
countries. In Denmark, this may be explained by the lack of banking participation in 
mortgages securities, which are supposed to be the type of loan that has lowest risk.  
Results of the regressions of beta indicate that bigger banks (size) are bound to 
higher systematic risk. Variables that decrease systematic risk are depository funding 
(funding structure) and tier 1 capital ratio (capitalization). This last variable reduces 
even more systematic risk in bigger banks. Moreover, when analyzing the effects of 
single variables on systematic risk we can also observe the negative effects of higher 
lending activity (lower market-based operations) and of higher leverage, which is even 
stronger for bigger banks. This partly confirms for the Danish case the effects of bank 
size, loans and leverage on systematic risk previously identified for Italian banks by 
Di Biase and D’Apolito (2012).  
Our results on determinants of systemic risk are to some extend in line with 
Laeven et al. (2016) and Pais and Stork (2013). No matter whether we use SRISK or 
LRMES to proxy systemic risk, bank size and the degree of market-based activities 
(relation between loans and assets) are significant variables. Bigger banks and those 
more involved in market-based activities have higher systemic risks. When systemic 
risk is proxied by LRMES, leverage is also significant and increases risk. Besides, 
bigger banks with higher leverage have an even higher systemic risk while the contrary 
is verified for those bigger banks with a higher share of deposits in total assets and 
higher shares of loans in total assets. When analyzing the effects of single variables on 
systemic risk (simple regressions) we can also observe the negative effects of a higher 
share of deposits in total assets (stable funding) and positive effect of leverage in 
systemic risk.  
Thus, the regulator should take into consideration bank size, funding structure, 
lending growth, involvement of banks in market-based activities, and capitalization 
structure when deciding upon the policy to be taken for reducing banking risk. Notice 
that the participation in market-based activities influence individual and systemic risk 
differently and could pose a trade-off to the regulator. These results apply to the Danish 
case, but might be expanded to other small economies with a highly concentrated 
banking sector.  
This discussion leads us to the reflection upon the efficiency of the 
measurements of the Danish regulative authorities after the financial crisis. They 
focused on ensuring financial stability of the entire financial system, employing both 
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micro- and macro-prudential strategies. They monitored certain indicators with the 
purpose of determining when or whether systemic risk was rising. The main intention 
was to increase the banks’ resilience to financial distress (The Systematic Risk 
Council, 2014). Therefore, the Systemic Risk Council decided to monitor systemic risk 
by controlling credit growth and leverage. According to our results, this makes sense, 
since capitalization is a key driver of both individual and systematic risk, while the 
share of loans in total assets decreases systemic risk. Leverage has an interaction effect 
with bank size and thus intensifies systemic risk in bigger banks. Tier 1 capital ratio is 
also one of the key indicators used in assessing the banks’ systemic risk, even though 
in our case it only proved to be significant for explaining individual and systematic 
risks.  
The Council further concentrates on excessive maturity mismatches and market 
illiquidity, which involves monitoring the continuous funding requirement of the 
sector and its composition and the financing provided by the capital markets. One 
indicator used for that is the customer funding surplus, “the difference between banking 
sector deposits and loans vis-à-vis counterparties that are not monetary financial 
institutions” (The Systemic Risk Council, 2014). To some extend in our analysis, the 
results on the fraction of funding of assets from deposits show this variable’s 
contribution to reduce all types of risk. Thus, there is a need for monitoring the funding 
structure of the financial system. 
The Systemic Risk Council considers that some of the banks are too large and 
complex so that these characteristics may increase systemic risk and its consequences 
when they are in distress. Thus, the Council monitors the business model of the 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions, the largest banks in Denmark (The 
Systemic Risk Council, 2014). However, they acknowledge that other large institutions 
could also become more vulnerable with size and organizational complexity, which 
suggests that not only the SIFIs should be considered.  
They further monitor whether the banks are involved in more risky lending 
activities, have higher capital leverage or a more risky funding structure. In this case, 
banks are also required to meet specific capital requirements to strengthen their 
positions against any possibility of financial distress (The Systemic Risk Council, 
2014).  
Our results reveal that an increase in bank size intensifies systematic and 
systemic risks. Thus, it is crucial to consider bank size in the regulation of the financial 
system. In addition to that, large banks with unstable funding structure need to be 
specially observed by the regulator. The Systemic Risk Council targets the 
interconnection among banks, which is considered an important factor in controlling 
systemic risk. Our results did not consider this interaction effect, even though other 
studies such as the one from Elsinger et al. (2012) confirm it. 
In summary, the Danish regulation generally controls systemic risk taking into 
consideration the measures expressed by the independent variables used in this article. 
Thus, our findings can be seen as a support for the implementation of the so-called 
countercyclical capital buffer introduced by Basel III and measurements the European 
Systemic Risk Board is working on in the capital requirements directives.   
However so far, the key indicators used by the Systemic Risk Council do not 
include the monitoring of market-based activities, which according to our analysis 
constitute one of the key variables that define systemic risk (share of loans in total 
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assets). The regulation of market-based activities in order to contain systemic risk can 
be very fruitful to our results. This micro-prudential policy could, however, increase 
individual risk. This trade-off has to be considered in Denmark and comparable 
cases.11  
7. Conclusion 
Embedded in the context of the financial crisis in a highly concentrated Danish 
banking sector and on the systemic risk debates, this paper examines the contributions 
of bank size, capitalization, funding structure, market activities and organizational 
complexity to individual, systematic and systemic risks.  
By analyzing the bank’s stock returns, beta factors and SRISK as well as 
LMRES, as measurements of individual, systematic and systemic risks respectively, 
our results reveal that:   
(1) Banks with more unstable funding showed higher individual risk during the 
shock periods that followed the financial crisis. The contrary was observed for 
capitalized banks and for those involved with market-based activities.  
(2) The size of banks does not affect their individual stock performance during 
the crisis, but increase their systematic and systemic risks. Tier 1 capital smooths the 
size effects on systematic risk. The same is valid for the share of deposits in assets in 
both systematic and systemic risks. Besides, leverage increases the effect of size in 
systemic risk while the opposite is valid for the relation between loans and total assets. 
(3) The degree of market-based activities (measured by non-interest income) 
increases stock performance during the crisis, acting as a stabilization in terms of 
individual risk. However, the degree of market-based activities (measured by a 
decrease of the loans-to-assets-ratio) increases systemic risk. Thus, an increase in the 
level of market-based activities has a destabilization effect on systematic and systemic 
risks. For the regulator, this may be seen as a trade-off between controlling the 
individual and systemic risks. If the idea of the regulator is to secure macroeconomic 
stability, we should expect that the degree of market-based activities should be 
controlled at the expense of reducing effects on individual risk.  
These results are consistent with the methods used for monitoring systemic risk 
carried out by the Systemic Risk Council in Denmark, with the purpose of detecting 
the build-up of potential systemic threats and consequently support the policy of 
countercyclical capital buffer. 
The Council focuses on bank’s lending growth, leverage, capitalization, 
funding structure, size and organizational complexity when assessing systemic risk. 
However, the market-based activities are not included as one of their key indicators 
monitored.  
Considering the magnitude of the effect of bank size and of market-based 
activities on systemic risk, it is crucial to acknowledge the shift towards a higher 
involvement in market-based activities as a potential threat to the financial system. 
                                                             
11 It has to be mentioned, of course, that we use two different manifest variables for the latent variable 
market-based activities, these are non-interest income and the loans-to-assets-ratio. Whereas non-interest 
income is significant in the case of individual risk, the loans-to-asset-ratio is significant with respect to 
systemic risk.  
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Therefore, the regulator should also take into consideration measures of market-based 
activities in order to limit the risk they may pose to the entire system.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 Sampled Banks 
Reg nr. Bank Name Market Share (%) 
3000 Danske Bank A/S 56.60% 
2222 Nordea Bank Danmark A/S 14.53% 
7858 Jyske Bank A/S 7.86% 
8079 Sydbank A/S 3.80% 
9380 Spar Nord Bank A/S 1.98% 
7730 Vestjysk Bank A/S 0.54% 
7670 Ringkjøbing Landbobank, Aktieselskab 0.53% 
7681 Alm. Brand Bank A/S 0.36% 
9217 Jutlander Bank 0.35% 
400 Lån og Spar Bank A/S 0.34% 
8099 Nordjyske Bank A/S 0.22% 
7320 Djurslands Bank A/S 0.17% 
844 Fynske Bank A/S 0.14% 
7780 Skjern Bank, Aktieselskabet 0.13% 
7230 Østjydsk Bank A/S 0.11% 
6520 Lollands Bank, Aktieselskab 0.07% 
7890 Salling Bank A/S 0.07% 
7930 Kreditbanken A/S 0.06% 
6880 Totalbanken A/S 0.06% 
6860 Nordfyns Bank Aktieselskabet 0.06% 
6140 Møns Bank, A/S 0.05% 
  88.03% 
Source: The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority. The market share was calculated using the data reported on 
31st of December, 2014, and was computed as the share of each bank’s assets in total assets of the 
entire banking sector. 
Table A2 Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Banks 







Total Assets (DKK) 174931800000 529436700000 1276555000 2678868000000 
Log of Total Assets  23.38 2.04 20.97 28.62 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%) 13.22 4.22 4.50 22.80 
Deposits/Assets (%) 60.61 14.31 28.60 84.40 
Loans/Assets (%) 63.35 9.90 37.80 78.70 
Non-interest Income share in 
Total Income (%) 
22.50 5.18 12.80 34.10 
Leverage ratio 12.29 5.60 5.02 26.79 
Stock Price (DKK) 301.39 493.99 8.06 3244.07 
Stock Return (decimals) -0.27 0.30 -0.84 0.36 
Beta  0.75 0.69 -0.36 2.55 
Restricted Sample for Systemic Risk 
SRISK 6106.00 10937.00 -470.00 31542.00 
Log of Total Assets  25.71 1.76 23.57 28.50 
Leverage ratio 15.8 4.34 7.89 22.53 
Non-interest Income share in 
Total Income (%) 
22.3 5.43 12.81 29.48 
Loans/Assets (%) 55.6 13.06 37.79 77.19 
Deposits/Assets (%) 47.6 11.66 28.60 72.68 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%) 13.9 3.7 8.33 20.9 
Sources: The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority Statistics, Yahoo Finance Historical Prices, Bloomberg. 
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Tier 1 Ratio 
(capitalization 
structure) 









-0.71 -0.02 0.55 *****   
Non-interest 









0.83 -0.57 -0.68 -0.57 -0.08 ***** 
Source: Complete data series for 21 Danish banks 















































































*****      
Tier 1 Ratio 
(capitalization 
structure) 









-0.96 -0.08 0.82 *****   
Non-interest 




0.16 0.28 -0.06 -0.33 *****  
Leverage 0.92 -0.32 -0.86 -0.883  0.04 ***** 
Source: Systemic Risk Data available only for five banks. 
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